The Half-Life of a Firewall Rule: A Quarterly Expiry Review for UK SMEs
Photo: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Savannah District, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons
Most UK SMEs do not set out to accumulate firewall exceptions. A port forward is opened for a project; a VPN account is created for a contractor; a vendor tunnel is stood up to support a line-of-business application. Each decision is reasonable at the time. The problem is that few of these decisions carry an end date, and even fewer carry a named owner who is still in the business.
The result is a rule cemetery: a configuration that records what was once needed, not what is needed now. For an SME, the risk is not abstract. Every open port, every dormant VPN credential and every vendor tunnel widens the attack surface and complicates the evidence you may be asked to produce for an insurer, a Cyber Essentials assessor or an ISO 27001 auditor. The remedy is not a one-off clean-up. It is a quarterly habit that treats firewall exceptions as governed exceptions.
The configuration is a historical document
A firewall rule set is often read as a statement of current intent. In practice it is closer to a diary of past decisions. A rule created for a migration may still be present years after the cut-over. A temporary vendor tunnel may have become the permanent route by which a support desk connects. A remote-access account for a leaver may remain enabled because nobody linked the HR record to the firewall.
This matters because attackers do not need a sophisticated exploit if an unnecessary door has been left open. They look for exposed management interfaces, unpatched services and credentials that should have been disabled. Insurers are increasingly asking for evidence that boundary devices are reviewed, not simply installed. Auditors want to see that access is granted on a least-privilege basis and removed when no longer required.
The starting point is to accept that an exception is a decision with a lifespan. It should be approved, recorded, reviewed and — in most cases — expired.
What a governed exception looks like
A governed exception is not simply a rule that someone remembers creating. It has a small set of attributes that make it reviewable. At minimum, the register should record:
- The rule or account identifier, and the device or platform where it exists.
- The service or business process it supports, described in plain language.
- The named owner — a person, not a team mailbox or a supplier.
- The business justification and who approved it.
- The date it was created and the date it is next due for review.
- An expiry date or review interval, with 90 days as a sensible default for temporary access.
- The evidence link: the change ticket, approval email or vendor request that authorised it.
For VPN accounts and vendor tunnels, add the individual or organisation identity, the authentication method, and the conditions under which access should be withdrawn. For port forwards, record the internal service, the external exposure and whether the service truly needs to be reachable from the internet rather than through a VPN or zero-trust access layer.
Run the review in five moves
First, export the truth. Pull the current rule base, NAT and port-forward tables, VPN account list and any vendor tunnels. Do not rely on memory or on the last diagram. Reconcile the export against the register you thought you had. The gap between the two is the first finding.
Second, attach a name to every entry. For each rule, identify the service it supports and the person accountable for that service. If nobody can explain why a rule exists, it is a candidate for removal. If the owner has left the business, the rule has lost its sponsor and should be re-approved or removed.
Third, separate service from habit. Ask whether the rule is still required for a live, documented business process. A rule that supports a current application is a service exception. A rule that exists because nobody has tested its removal is a habit. The distinction matters when you present evidence: habits are harder to defend.
Fourth, test before you delete. Removal should follow change control. For low-risk rules, disable the rule in an agreed window and monitor for business impact. For higher-risk rules, agree a rollback plan with the owner. The outcome is not merely a smaller rule set; it is a documented decision that the business still needs the exception — or that it does not.
Fifth, re-approve with an end date. Where the exception remains necessary, record the re-approval, the owner and the next review date. Where it does not, remove it and keep the ticket as evidence. A quarterly review that produces neither removals nor re-approvals is not a review; it is a ritual.
Vendor tunnels and remote access deserve their own line
Vendor tunnels are among the most persistent exceptions in SME environments. They are often created to support a finance system, a manufacturing application or a managed service, and they frequently bypass the normal joiner-mover-leaver process. The same is true of remote-access accounts for contractors and support partners.
Treat each tunnel as a supplier relationship with an access dimension. Record the vendor organisation, the named individuals who use it, the authentication method, the services reachable through it and the date the commercial relationship is next due for renewal. When the contract ends, the tunnel should end with it. When a named engineer leaves the vendor, their access should be removed even if the tunnel remains.
This is not about distrust of suppliers. It is about ensuring that access reflects a current contract and a current person, not an old project.
Evidence that stands up to scrutiny
A firewall review produces two outputs: a cleaner configuration and an evidence pack. The evidence pack should include the current exception register, the export of the rule base at review date, the change tickets for removals and re-approvals, and a short summary of what changed and why.
That pack is useful in several settings. Cyber Essentials looks for boundary firewalls and internet gateways to be configured and managed. ISO 27001 auditors expect access control and network security controls to be reviewed. Insurers increasingly ask whether remote access is inventoried and whether firewall rules are periodically reviewed. A dated, owner-led register answers those questions far better than an assurance that the firewall is “managed by the IT provider”.
Make the cadence stick
A quarterly review is realistic for most UK SMEs. It is frequent enough to catch drift, but not so frequent that it becomes paperwork. Put the review in the diary, assign it to a named person and report the outcome in the monthly service review with your IT provider. Set a default expiry of 90 days for temporary exceptions, and require a fresh business justification for anything that survives.
The outcome is not a prettier firewall. It is a boundary that reflects the business as it is today, with fewer unexplained doors and a defensible record of the ones that remain. For ResultIT readers, that is the practical test: every rule should have an owner, a purpose and a date — or it should be removed.